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CHIPPING AWAY AT THE BIRNBAUM DOCTRINE:
MANOR DRUG STORES v. BLUE CHIP STAMPS'
In June of 1972, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in
Mount Clemens Industries, Inc. v. Bell,2 adopted the so-called Birn-
baum doctrine,3 which requires that a plaintiff must either be a pur-
chaser or seller of securities in order to satisfy the standing requirement
in a lOb-5 cause of action.4 Approximately fifteen months after the
Mount Clemens decision, the Ninth Circuit carved out an exception to
the purchaser-seller limitation in Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip
Stamps. The majority opinion, written by Judge Browning and joined
in by Judge Choy, held that where a consent decree establishes with cer-
tainty the parties, the prices and the amounts of securities to be pur-
chased or sold, there need not be an actual purchase or sale to ful-
fill the Birnbaum standing requirement.5 Judge Hufstedler strongly
dissented, arguing that the policy enunciated by the majority created
an unwarranted exception to the Birnbaum doctrine and was inconsist-
ent with the court's earlier decision in Mount Clemens.'
1. 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 302 (1974).
2. 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972).
3. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
956 (1952).
4. Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b)
(1970), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manip-
ulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regu-
lations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Rule X-10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1974), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person ....
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a ma-
terial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
(Emphasis added).
5. 492 F.2d at 142.
6. Id.
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The original judicial promulgation of the purchaser-seller limitation
in lOb-5 actions was set forth in the landmark case of Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp.7 In Birnbaum, the defendant held the dual posi-
tion of president and controlling shareholder of Newport Steel Cor-
poration. He refused to consummate what was allegedly a highly advan-
tageous tender offer and, instead, negotiated on his own behalf to sell
his control shares at a substantial premium to a syndicate of Newport's
customers, which would then use Newport to supply the syndicate with
products at a reduced price." This latter transaction, which enabled the
defendant to reap a huge profit, resulted in substantial detriment to
the other shareholders." The plaintiff, a shareholder of Newport,
brought the action alleging violation of rule lOb-5. His one obstacle
to trial on the merits was that no "purchase or sale" of a security had
been made.' 0 Realizing the necessity for limiting the scope of rule
lOb-5," the Birnbaum court analogized this rule with section 16(b)"2
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934:
The absence of a similar provision in Section 10(b) strengthens the
conclusion that that Section was directed solely at that type of mis-
representation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale
or purchase of securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement
7. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
8. Id. at 462.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 462-63.
11. In coming to the conclusion that the purchaser-seller limitation was needed, the
court in Birnbaum referred to the SEC Exchange Release No. 3230, May 21, 1942, in
order to demonstrate that the intent of the rule was to close an existing loophole in the
securities law. 193 F.2d at 463. The court noted that the wording of the rule "copied"
that of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77q(a) (1970), with the
two exceptions that the words "the person" were substituted for the phrase "any pur-
chaser" and the clause "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" was
unique to the rule. 193 F.2d at 463. Section 17(a) basically dealt with fraud or de-
ceived purchasers and section 15(c) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. 78o(c) (1970), dealt
with fraud on broker-dealers. The loophole was that no cause of action existed for
"sellers" within the statutory scheme of the securities law. See 1 A. BROMBERO, SECUIU-
TIns LA W: FRAU], SEC RuLE lob-5 17-20 (1971) [hereinafter cited as BROMNBERO];
Whitaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine: An Assessment, 23 ALA. L. Rv. 543, 546 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Whitaker].
12. Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act provides in pertinent part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale
and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted
security) within any period of less than six months, ... shall inure to. and be re-
coverable by the issuer.
15 U.S.C. 78p(b) (1970).
[Vol. 8
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of corporate affairs, and that Rule X-10b-5 extended protection only to
the defrauded purchaser or seller.13
The Birnbaum court thus read into rule lOb-5 the prerequisite that a
plaintiff must either be a purchaser or seller of a security "in connec-
tion with" the activities proscribed by the rule in order to acquire stand-
ing.14
The United States Supreme Court has offered no definitive statement
as to the necessity of the purchaser-seller limitation. In Superintendent
of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,' 5 the Court specifically re-
13. 193 F.2d at 464 (emphasis added). The legislative history of the Securities and
Exchange Act and the administrative history of rule lOb-5 clearly indicate that the
Act was intended neither to cover all types of corporate fraud nor to preempt the
securities field; rather, the Act was intended to supplement the securities field and pro-
tect certain exchanges in the market. For a general discussion of the legislative and ad-
ministrative history and for the purpose of the section and the rule, see Mount Clemens
Industries, Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 342 n.6 (9th Cir. 1972); Kohn v. American Metal
Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 276-78 (3d Cir.) (Adams, J., concurring and dissenting),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972); 1 BROMBERG, supra note 11, at 22-22.8; Note, SEC
Action Against Fraudulent Purchasers of Securities, 59 HARv. L. REv. 769, 770 (1946).
14. 193 F.2d at 494.
15. 404 U.S. 6 (1971). Bankers Life involved a deliberate, carefully planned and
quite complex five million dollar fraud. Bankers Life wholly owned Manhattan Cas-
ualty, which was purchased by Bourne and Begole for $5,000,000, the funds of which
came from a loan from Irving Trust Co. To pay off this loan, the new president of
Manhattan, installed by Bourne and Begole, sold four and one-half million dollars of
the company's Treasury Bonds in a bona fide transaction. Proceeds from the sale, plus
cash from Manhattan, were used to pay off Irving Trust. The entire transaction oc-
curred on the same day. To cover-up this fraud, another $5,000,000 was borrowed from
Irving and deposited in another financial institution. Using the certificate of deposit
from this financial institution as collateral, money was borrowed to pay off Irving
Trust. It thus appeared that Manhattan had sold the bonds and deposited the money,
thereby covering up any fraud.
The only injury in this fraud was not to the shareholders of Manhattan, since Bourne
and Bogole were the sole shareholders, but rather to the creditors of Manhattan. The
question here becomes whether the Superintendent of Insurance of New York, who be-
came a receiver for the bankrupt Manhattan, could sue under rule lOb-5.
The district court held that the fraud was not "in connection with the purchase or
sale" of the bonds, but rather a fraudulent misappropriation of the proceeds from the
sale. In doing so, the court used a limited reading of Birnbaum, that 10b-5 was not
intended to remedy general corporate fraud, but only designed for fraud "in connection
with" the purchase or sale of securities. The court of appeals supported this narrow
holding when it stated that the fraud was not affecting investors or the securities market
and that the public market was unaffected.
The Bankers Life case was unanimously reversed on appeal, Justice Douglas writing
the opinion. The Court held that both the district and circuit courts had read the scope
of 10b-5 too narrowly and that, while the statute did not intend to regulate all the inter-
nal management of a corporation, it nonetheless must be given a broad and expansive
reading. Justice Douglas stated that "[tihe crux of the present case is that Manhattan
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fused the opportunity to determine whether or not a purchase or sale was
in fact required.' 6 With the Supreme Court's refusal to deal with- the
limitation, there has arisen a number of cases which attempt to avoid the
Birnbaum doctrine, either by distinguishing the factual pattern or by
forging an exception to the limitation itself.'1  The most recent case to
do so is the Seventh Circuit case of Eason v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp.' In Eason, the plaintiffs were shareholders of an issuer that
exchanged stock for a car leasing business. The plaintiffs also guaran-
teed notes given by the issuer to the defendant. The car leasing busi-
ness failed, and a lOb-5 action was brought for misrepresentation of the
value of the business. The court held that the shareholders were both
investors and direct parties to the transaction; thus they should be pro-
tected by lOb-5.1' Although the plaintiffs did not have to be pur-
chasers-sellers, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were required to'
[the seller] suffered an injury as a result of deceptive practices touching its sale of se-
curities as an investor." Id. at 12-13.
16. Id. at 13-14 n.10.
17. For those cases supporting the Birnbaum doctrine, see, e.g., Smith v. Murchison,
310 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Erling v. Powell, 298 F. Supp. 1154 (D.S.D. 1969),
affd, 429 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1970); Christophides v. Porco, 289 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). For those cases which have successfully distinguished the Birnbaumn doctrine,
see, e.g., Eason v. GMAC, 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960
(1974); Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 970 (1967); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1967).
18. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974). Eason in-
volved the sale of a car leasing business to the shareholders of a corporation. Plaintiffs,
shareholders of the purchasing company, individually guaranteed certain notes issued by
the car leasing business. The leasing business subsequently failed, and the defendant
brought suit to collect on the guarantee. The plaintiffs responded by filing suit in
United States district court charging a violation of section 10(b) and seeking rescission
of the guarantees. Id. at 656. Plaintiffs contended (1) that they were "forced sellers,"
(2) that they were indirect purchasers of the stock, and (3) that the Birnbaum doctrine
should be overruled, at least in the Seventh Circuit.
The Birnbaum case, according to the court of appeal, interpreted the 10b-5 standing
requirement in a "constitutional and jurisdictional sense." The court disagreed with
that interpretation and stressed that the proper standing test really was whether "the
plaintiff is a person who has suffered a legal wrong." Thus, the question for thig
case becomes whether plaintiff was in the class of persons to be protected and whether
there was an injury. Id. at 658.
The court then discussed the broad application that has been given section 10(b) ac-
tions as -well as the broad scope of "persons" protected by the action. With this back-
ground, the court found that the plaintiffs indeed should be protected from this fraudu-
lent scheme. Id. at 658-60. In a final analysis, the court found that neither the mere
possibility of an influx of section 10(b) cases nor the appearance of consistency in in-
terpretation was paramount to the protection of defrauded investors. Hence, the
plaintiffs were granted standing to sue under & ctign 10(b). Id. It 660-61,
q~ U t 6 9-
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show that they were within the class of persons sought to be protected by
the rule.20 Recent cases such as Eason lead inescapably to one conclu-
sion: in a jurisdiction where the Birnbaum doctrine is in force, it is
mandatory to determine who is and who is not considered a purchaser
or seller.
Given the recent judicial interpretations, it should be noted that one
need not be an actual "purchaser or seller" of securities in order to
qualify for standing. The Securities and Exchange Act itself recog-
nizes in section 3(a) (13) and (14) that a contractual relationship
to buy or sell a security is tantamount to an actual purchase or sale;
21
hence, legally enforceable contracts have universally been held by
courts as granting to the plaintiff the position of a statutory purchaser-
seller.22  Congress, however, has not elaborated as to exactly what con-
stitutes a contract for the purposes of lOb-5.23  Of course, any contract
in the traditional sense of the word falls within the rule. A question
arises only when an agreement is not technically a contract under a
strict legal definition, but nonetheless is sufficiently analogous to one to
come within a broad definition of the term. Generally, the courts have
been disposed to give 1Ob-5 a broad and liberal interpretation 24 and thus
20. Id. at 660.
21. 15 U.S.C. 78c (13) & (14) (1970) provide:
(13) The terms "buy" and "purchase" each include any contract to buy, purchase,
or otherwise acquire.
(14) The terms "sale" and "sell" each include any contract to sell or otherwise dis-
pose of.
22. See Mount Clemens Indus. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 345 (9th Cir. 1972).
23. In making the provision to treat a contract as an actual purchase or sale, Congress
realized that the parties to a contract, and the rights or correlative duties of the parties,
are sufficiently defined so that, in the case of a breach, the courts will not have to worry
about both the identity of the party possessing the right and the extent of the right pos-
sessed. From the viewpoint of the securities market, there is no question that a contract
or option contract is a legally enforceable agreement; thus the purchase or sale is con-
structively made when the contract is signed and has become enforceable. It is entirely
logical that such a contract be given the same treatment as an actual purchase or sale.
In the determination of what constitutes a contract, 15 U.S.C. 78c (1970) is not help-
ful since the term "contract" is not defined. "Congress merely used the word contract.
It reads too much into the use of this word to conclude that executed contracts fall
within the definitions but that executory contracts are not covered." Whitaker, supra
note 11, at 558 n.70.
24. In A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967), there was a scheme
to perpetrate a fraud on a stockbroker. Perlow, the defendant, placed orders to buy
certain securities on the New York Stock Exchange with the intent of paying for the
stock only if the price subsequently rose. Perlow ordered a block of shares of two dif-
ferent stocks which went down in price after the order but before he had paid for them,
and he refused to pay for them. Consequently the broker, Brod, was forced to resell at
a loss. Id. at 395. The district court dismissed the action for a lack of "fraud or deceit"
1975]
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give "contracts" a broad interpretation so that a plaintiff may acquire
standing under lOb-5.
The courts have also recognized a number of exceptions which ex-
tend standing under lOb-5 even though the disputed transactions did
not involve an "actual" purchase or sale or a contractual relationship.
The most notable qualification to the purchaser-seller limitation is the
so-called "forced seller" doctrine, enunciated by the Second Circuit in
Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co.25 In Vine, the holders of -the Class
B common stock negotiated a sale of their minority control stock for
a substantial premium in a transaction which resulted in a shot-form
merger. The Class A shareholders were given the option to either ten-
der their shares to the purchasing corporation at a fraction of their mar-
ket value before the merger or hold onto their shares of a now defunct
corporation.26  The plaintiffs decided not to sell the stock to the pur-
chasing company because of the low offering price 7 and subsequently
brought suit for a 10b-5 violation. The district court dismissed the suit
on grounds that the plaintiffs failed to meet the purchaser-seller
requirement. 28  The Second Circuit, however, upheld the plaintiffs'
contention that they had standing to assert a violation of lOb-5 because
they were "forced sellers." It reasoned that for all practical purposes
their only real alternative was to sell their Class A stock at a fraction
of its pre-merger value.29
within the scope of section 10(b) or rule lOb-5.
The court of appeals reversed, stating that section 10(b) was connected with prevent-
ing manipulative devices perpetrated "in connection with the purchase or sale" of any
securities. The court held that, since the section was to have regulations established
"in the public interest," stockbrokers as well as investors should be protected. Since this
was an action only upon the pleadings, the court assumed that the allegations of the
complaint were true and held these allegations did state a claim under which relief could
be granted under 10b-5. The court went on to note that this type of practice must be
curtailed and that "artificial" distinctions should not be made in dealing with lOb-
5 recoveries.
25. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
26. Id. at 630.
27. Id. at 630-31.
28. Id. at 630.
29. Id. at 635. In this case, there was an allegedly fraudulent plan to take over
Crown, a small loan corporation, by the larger NYSE-listed corporation of Beneficial
Finance. Beneficial sought to receive a better price for the short-form merger by over-
paying the relatively small number of Class B stockholders, who numbered approxi-
mately 45,000, but because of special voting arrangements, controlled the corporation.
Beneficial would then grossly underpay the approximately 625,000 Class A shareholders,
thereby making a highly advantageous take-over of Crown. In this manner, Beneficial
convinced the management of Crown to advise the less sophisticated Class A share-
holders to sell at the undervalued price; the minority Class B shareholders would
BIRNBAUM DOCTRINE
Another Second Circuit decision evidencing a liberal attitude toward
the standing requirement of 10b-5, Mutual Shares v. Genesco, Inc.,"0
held that the purchaser-seller limitation had no application to those
cases in which the remedy sought was equitable relief. The plaintiff in
Mutual Shares, a minority shareholder, had brought suit seeking equi-
table relief and monetary damages alleging various fraudulent schemes.
The controlling shareholders manipulated the market price of the
shares and withheld dividends in order to force minority shareholders
to sell out at deflated prices.31  The court held that the plaintiffs must
rely on sales of shares made at the deflated value in order to collect
monetary damages. But, as to the equitable relief sought for the pre-
vention of future manipulation, the court held that the Birnbaum doc-
trine did not apply.32 Referring to SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc.,83 it observed, "'It is not necessary in a suit for equitable
or prophylactic relief to establish all the elements required in a suit for
monetary damages.' "4
While the Second Circuit has provided an incessant array of cases
dealing with the Birnbaum doctrine, it was not until the Mount Cle-
mens"3 decision that the Ninth Circuit dealt with this issue in depth.
The plaintiff in Mount Clemens alleged that he was precluded from
purchasing securities at a sheriff's sale because of misrepresentations
made by the defendant that the securities were worthless. 36  The dis-
trict court held that the plaintiff was barred from bringing an action
because he had not purchased or contracted to purchase any securi-
benefit and the Class A shareholders would be injured. In this manner, Beneficial
would underpay approximately $300,000 in tangible assets and $500,000 in going busi-
ness value. Id. at 630-31.
Beneficial succeeded in purchasing 95% of the outstanding Class A stock, thereby suc-
cessfully completing a short-form merger. Vine was one Class A shareholder who nei-
ther sold his stock nor accepted his statutory appraisal rights. The alternative was
to hold worthless shares of a now defunct corporation. The plaintiff decided to hold
out and not participate in the fraudulent scheme, thus he never sold the stock. The court
noted, "It is true that appellant still has his stock; if he turned it in for the price of
$3.29 a share, it would be clearer that appellant is a seller. Assuming that this would
not otherwise affect his right to sue under the Act and the Rule, requiring him to do
so as a condition to suit seems a needless formality." Id. at 634. The court further
concluded that, since Vine was a seller, Beneficial was an imputed buyer. Hence, an
action under lOb-5 was upheld.
30. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
31. Id. at 542.
32. Id. at 546-47.
33. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
34. 384 F.2d at 547, citing 375 U.S. at 193.
35. 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972).
6. 1d 4t 540-41,
1975]
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ties. 37  The Court of Appeals, in affirming the lower court decision,
relied significantly upon the reasoning of Iroquois Industries, Inc. V.
Syracuse China Corp.,8 one of the most recent affirmations of the
Birnbaum doctrine. The Mount Clemens court did indicate that a
plaintiff need not be an actual purchaser or seller if he is a party to a
contract or falls within the "forced seller" exception. As the court
noted:
Yet that circumstance [that plaintiff was not actually a purchaser or
seller] does not end our inquiry, for under the liberal interpretation that
has sometimes attended the application of the Birnbaum doctrine, there
have been cases in which standing has been afforded to persons who,
even though not actual purchasers or sellers, have been deemed to have
the required status.
8 9
The court also discussed the "aborted purchaser-seller" doctrine which
applies in a situation where material misleading information causes
the purchaser or seller to refuse to carry through with the transaction.
The court went to great lengths to note that it is the element of a con-
tractual relationship that elevates this type of transaction to the realm
of purchaser-seller.40 Hence, the "aborted purchaser-seller" doctrine
is not an exception to the standing requirement, but rather a judicial
recognition of the statutory purchaser-seller. 41 Since -there was no con-
tractual relationship present in Mount Clemens, the court concluded
that the plaintiff could not be vested with standing under the poorly
phrased "aborted purchaser-seller exception."
Ironically, the Mount Clemens court intimated -that, if the plaintiffs
would have brought a derivative action instead of a direct one, they
37. Id. at 341.
38. 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970). In Iroquois,
the appellant made a public offer to purchase 50,000 shares of Syracuse China. Syra-
cuse resisted, the tender offer failed, and Iroquois instituted this action under lob-5. The
action alleged that there was a fraudulent resistance to the tender offer by a misleading
letter from the management of Syracuse to the shareholders arguing that the tender offer
should be defeated. Allegations included false statements regarding the up-coming
merger of the corporations. The question became whether or not this fraud could be
redressed by 10b-5.
The court, after reviewing a great deal of case law, concluded that the Birnbaum doc-
trine had not been overruled, at least so far as damages were concerned, and that the
policy reasons behind the doctrine were still viable. The court therefore found that the
plaintiffs did not have standing and dismissed this action, suggesting that the plaintiffs
bring an action under state blue sky laws or perhaps under another section of the federal
securities law.
39. 464 F.2d at 345.
40. Id. at 345-46.
41. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 8
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would have qualified as "forced sellers. '42  However, the court felt
that the case had progressed too far to allow a change in the nature
of the action. The result of denying standing because of the method
of filing an action contravenes the basic posture that other courts have
felt should be the proper approach to the Birnbaum doctrine.
4
The Birnbaum doctrine was firmly established in the Ninth Circuit
when the Manor Drug case was decided in October of 1973. The case
evolved from previous litigation which had been resolved by a consent
decree.44  In the original proceeding, the United States brought suit
against Blue Chip Stamp Company and nine other co-defendants for
monopolizing the California trading stamp business in violation of sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.45  Non-shareholding distributors of
the stamps also claimed that they had an equitable interest in $20,-
000,000 of the accumulated profits of Blue Chip Stamp Company.40
The Company agreed to a consent divestiture decree which required
that it sell approximately 55% of the outstanding shares of a new
corporation, Blue Chip Stamps (hereinafter BCS), to non-shareholding
users of the stamps in proportion to their use of the stamps. This was
to be accomplished by selling "units" of securities of BCS; each unit
was to consist of one debenture and three shares of common voting
stock.41  The unit selling price for the participating users was $101,
but the fair market value of each unit was $315. 4s In this manner, the
42. 464 F.2d at 344 n.9, 347 n.14. Mount Clemens Industries and Mount Clemens
Corporation alleged that they were fraudulently dissuaded from purchasing securities
from Missile Dynamics Corporation at a sheriff's sale. The alleged fraudulent misrep-
resentations were made to them by a former director of Missile Dynamics who claimed
that the stock was worthless. As it related to 10b-5, the district court dismissed the
claim. Id. at 340-41.
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the Birnbaum doctrine had been distinguished by
so many different qualifying factual situations that it had been eroded to the point where
it was no longer the law. In addition, the SEC, in an amicus curiae brief, argued that
the Birnbaum decision was incorrect when decided, even if it had not been eroded out
of the case law. Id. at 341. The court was not persuaded by either of these arguments
and went on to hold that, since the plaintiffs could not be "purchasers," the ruling of
the district court should be affirmed and the action dismissed. Id. at 344-47.
43. See note 13 supra.
44. United States v. Blue Chip Stamps Co., 272 F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd
sub nom., Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United States, 398 U.S. 580 (1969).
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 (1970). Blue Chip Stamp Company was originally intended
to be a nonprofit organization wholly owned and controlled by the patronizing users of
the stamps.
46. 492 F.2d at 139.
47. Id.
48. Id.
1975]
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profits of the old company would be evenly distributed to all users of
the stamps who chose to purchase the shares of the new corporation
at the pro rata amount.
The existing shareholders of Blue Chip Stamp Company, who opposed
the dilution of their holdings, proceeded to discourage new offerees
from accepting the offer as formulated pursuant to the consent decree.40
This was achieved by making fraudulent representations concerning
the true value and future outlook of BCS securities through the circula-
tion of a prospectus which raised serious questions as to the financial
future of BCS. Specifically, the prospectus over-emphasized outstand-
ing unsettled litigation against the company and overstated the redemp-
tion rate of the stamps in comparison with previous years. 0 Because
these misrepresentations dissuaded the plaintiffs from exercising their
right to purchase their pro rata number of offered units, they com-
menced a lOb-5 action seeking damages in the amount of the differ-
ence between the offering price and the present fair market value of
the units."1
Since neither a purchase nor a sale had been made and since no
contractual relationship, in the strict legal sense of the term, was in-
volved, the issue centered around whether or not the plaintiffs could
satisfy the purchaser-seller requirement. Indeed, the district court had
dismissed the case for a failure to comply with Birnbaum.2 However,
in reviewing the transactions, the Manor Drug majority stated that rule
lOb-5 was not confined to "consummated purchases or sales." 58  By
characterizing the consent decree as a functional equivalent of a con-
tract,5" the court extended the Birnbaum purchase-sale requirement to
encompass parties to a consent decree where the price, quantity, and
parties of the sale were specifically designated.
In discussing atypical transactions qualifying under lOb-5, the Manor
Drug court, relying on Mount Clemens, stated that the "common link"
which elevates non-purchaser-sellers to actual purchaser-seller status is
the contractual relationship of the parties. (This is not, as previously
noted, an accurate statement, since the Act itself gives standing to
parties of a contract, and thus they need not be elevated to that posi-
tion.) It seems reasonable to conclude that, if the consent decree"5 is
49. Id.
50. Id. at 139 n.6.
51. Id. at 140.
52. Id. at 138.
53. Id. at 140.
54. Id. at 142.
55. Black's Law Dictionary defines a consent decree as "[o]ne entered by consent of
[Vol. 8
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sufficiently analogous to a contract, 56 then it should be afforded the
same status as a contract. In finding that a consent decree served the
same function as did a contract, the court realized that, although it is
not directly enforceable against a violating party (as is a contract), 5"
it is indirectly enforceable in that it will evidence any stipulated facts. 8
Moreover, the majority's opinion is not premised on the aspect of en-
forceability of either ithe contract or the consent decree. Rather, the
majority is concerned with the ability of the consent decree to satisfy
with certainty the elements and necessary details of the 10b-5 cause
of action; such factors include the plaintiffs, the price and the number
of securities in question.5" Even though the contract and the consent
decree differ in the matter of enforceability, the court found that there
were enough other similarities to dismiss the argument that the plain-
tiffs did not fall within the Birnbaum doctrine.60
In such circumstances, Judge Browning and Judge Choy felt that
the consent decree was just as efficacious in determining the elements
of proof of loss and causation as a contract.61 In a contract, the parties,
price and other provisions are sufficiently definite to enable the courts
to determine actual damages suffered by either party. The consent
decree involved in Manor Drug offered the same protections: the plain-
tiffs, the non-shareholding users of the stamps, were entitled to receive
the $101 units in an amount specifically determined by the number of
the parties; it is not properly a judicial sentence, but is in the nature of a solemn contract
or agreement of the parties, made under the sanction of the court, and in effect an ad-
mission by them that the decree is a iust determination of their rights upon the real facts
of the case, if such facts had been proved." BLAcK's LAw DICIoNARY 499 (4th ed.
rev. 1968). For an in depth look at the use of the phrase "consent decree," see Norman
v. Norman, 111 N.E.2d 377 (Il. App. Ct. 1953); Dulles v. Dulles, 85 A.2d 134, 137
(Pa. 1952); 8A WoRns AND PHRASES Consent Decree (1951).
56. See notes 21-24 supra and accompanying text.
57. 492 F.2d at 142 n.14.
58. Id. at 142.
59. Id.
60. The majority, although explicitly noting in a footnote that a consent decree could
not be directly enforceable, emphasized the insignificance of this factor. The ac-
tion was not brought for a violation of a consent decree but rather under 10b-5; the
only use of the consent decree was to insure standing. The plaintiff only incidentally
relied on the decree, and the extent of its enforceability was not crucial for its use in the
case. Id. at 142 n.14.
61. See note 23 supra. Under the recent Supreme Court decision, the causation re-
quired under a lob-5 cause of action is that of "causation in fact." Affiliated Ute Citi-
zens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1971). Thus, the question in Manor Drug
becomes, did the defendants "in fact" dissuade the plaintiffs from exercising their right
to a pro rata distribution of the stock of BCS. For a further treatment of damages and
causation, see note 63 infra.
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stamps they used. Also, the fair market value of the units was readily
verifiable at $315 per unit. 2 With the certainty of these factors, the
court would have little difficulty in ascertaining who has been injured
and the extent of that injury.6 3  Thus, the majority's conclusion that
these factors make the consent decree commensurate to a contract for
the purposes of lob-5 is reasonable. The great price differential be-
tween the offering price and the fair market value insured that, but
for the false representations, the plaintiffs would have purchased all of
the units offered to them. Even if the offerees were low on cash and
were forced to purchase on margin, it is highly unlikely that they would
have failed to participate in what was, in reality, an outright distribution
of profits. Thus, the court reversed and remanded the case for trial on
the merits."
4
Judge Hufstedler, in denouncing the majority's expansion of the
purchaser-seller doctrine, thought the opinion to be inconsistent with
the earlier decision in Mount Clemens. First, she voiced concern for
the majority's characterization of the consent decree as the functional
equivalent of the contractual relationship by stating that "the functions
of a contract and of the consent decree are . . . not equivalent."' 5
Second, and more importantly, she asserted that "[a] consent divestiture
decree cannot function similarly because it is not a 'contract' within
the meaning of the statute .... "66
No one would seriously disagree with Judge Hufstedler's first asser-
tion; however, she incorrectly assessed the majority's analysis. The
62. 492 F.2d at 139.
63. For cases dealing with related problems in the determination of damages and cau-
sation, see, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1971)
(in which the "causation in fact" test was firmly established as the proper causation
test); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974) (private action for non-disclosure in which the court held that lack of privity,
an inability to prove reliance, and the fact that the plaintiffs bought on the exchange
did not prevent the claim for damages); Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167
(2d Cir. 1970) (which followed the causation in fact test); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse
Air Brake Company, 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970)
(where it was held that the lack of privity between parties should not bar a lob-5 ac-
tion); Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 913 (1970) (it was reiterated that if there were no causation for damages the
defendants could be held liable to all the people in the world); List v. Fashion Park,
Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965) (where the court refused
to discard the basic causation element to the lob-5 cause of action).
64. 492 F.2d at 142.
65. Id. at 143.
66. Id. at 144.
BIRNBAUM DOCTRINE
majority only stated that, when dealing with the consent decree for the
purposes of the lOb-5 standing requirement, it is functionally equiva-
lent to contractual relationships, although admittedly not embracing all
of the formalities of that relationship.
Judge Hufstedler's second point clearly ignores the liberal interpre-
tation that courts have universally applied to the definition of a contract
for the purpose of lOb-5 standing."7 Although the terms "purchase"
and "sale" are defined by Congress,6" it has been left to the courts to
ascertain what Congress intended the term "contract" to encompass.69
To summarily dismiss the consent decree seems to be a basic contradic-
tion of the congressional purpose of including the term "contract" within
the phrase "purchase or sale.""0  Courts have always been ready to
admit that the unorthodox transactions should not escape the purview
of the 10b-5 proscription solely because of their uniqueness. 71  This
is exemplified by the Second Circuit case of A.T. Brod & Co. v. Per-
low, 72 wherein the court stated:
We believe that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 prohibit all fraudu-
lent schemes in connection with the purchase or sale of securities,
whether the artifices employed involve a garden type variety of fraud,
or present a unique form of deception. Novel or atypical methods
should not provide immunity from the securities laws.73
If such were not the case, many transactions would 'be structured in
a manner to avoid potential lOb-5 liability. And, from the viewpoint
of the individual investor, there seems to be no strong rationale to tell
one investor that he may sue because he has a legally binding contract,
and to say to another that he may not sue because his transaction, al-
though providing the same protections of a contract and although the
functional equivalent of a contract, is not a contract within the strict
interpretation of the word.74
67. See Mount Clemens Industries, Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 346 n.12 (9th Cir.
1972). See also Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S.
6 (1971).
68. See note 21 supra.
69. Id.
70. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952).
71. See Boone & McGowan, Standing to Sue Under SEC Rule l0b-5, 49 TXAS L.
REV. 617, 623 (1971). See also Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A
New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268 (1968); Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
72. 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
73. Id. at 397.
74. See notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text.
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The apparent motivation of the dissent throughout the opinion is the
fear of potential adverse ramifications inherent in expanding the class
of persons who will be granted standing under lOb-5. At one point,
Judge Hufstedler states:
Incautious loosening of the purchaser-seller rule will generate federal
litigation, increase the cost of marketing securities, inject into securi-
ties marketing new risk factors that defy accurate assessment, expose
offers to draconian damage claims, and invite strike suits. 7
Yet the majority did not abolish the purchaser-seller limitation, nor did
it make compliance easy for anyone and everyone. Rather, it merely re-
sponded with a specific isolated exception clearly merited by the factual
context. To prevent these plaintiffs from suing because of an overly
narrow construction of the term "contract" would "subordinate sub-
stance to form""6 and would disregard the underlying purpose of the
statute. Although the majority's position might require more court time
in determining what circumstances will lead to a functional equivalent
of a contract (certainly all consent decrees cannot be said to have this
status) and might lead to less uniformity in the application of lOb-5,
these inherent evils should be tolerated in order to more effectively
prevent misrepresentation in the securities market.
Although the majority's position is well reasoned, the admonitions
of the dissent should not be perfunctorily disregarded. 7  If the expan-
sion of the standing requirement is not closely scrutinized to make sure
that the aspects of proof of loss and causation are certain, the courts
will, for all practical purposes, overrule the Birnbaum doctrine. And,
one must agree with the logic of the dissent that once a rule has
been expanded, further expansion is inevitable. 78 The only answer to
this caveat is that the courts in the future must be painfully aware of
what the purchaser-seller rule is designed to do and heed those pur-
poses.79 If this is done, then there will be no question that lOb-5 will
75. 492 F.2d at 147 (footnote omitted).
76. Id. at 142.
77. One argument in Judge Hufstedler's dissent is that a federal standing requirement
"insures" that the litigants are sufficiently adverse to satisfy the case or controversy re-
quirement of Article MI of the Constitution and that the standing requirement thus con-
fines the persons who may bring suit to only those whom Congress intended to provide
a remedy. Id. at 146. But it is this very factor of congressional intent that the majority
relied upon to buttress its decision. Id. at 141. As is often the case, different judges
have read congressional purpose as supportive of different results on the same issue.
78. Id. at 142-48.
79. The Manor Drug court set forth the purpose of the rule as follows:
Like the provisions of the statute and rule relating to coverage, the Birnbaum
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not outgrow its purpose. This responsibility lies with the trial courts
to determine in each "atypical or novel" situation whether -there is a
functional equivalent to the contractual relationship; if this is accom-
plished, then the standing rule shall be exactly as it was conceived to
be.
CONCLUSION
On November 12, 1974, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to review the Manor Drug. decision. The continuing validity
of the Ninth Circuit opinion as well as the Birnbaum doctrine will de-
pend on the Court's final resolution of the case.
On petition for certiorari,80 the petitioners first argued that the Ninth
Circuit's decision is in conflict with opinions of the Second,
81 Third,8 2
FifthP8 Sixth8 4 and Eighth 85 Circuits, which require a plaintiff under
"purchaser-seller" standing requirement is to be construed to accomplish Congress'
purpose. If this were the sole consideration, standing would be allowed to any per-
son whose investment decision was affected by fraud, whether the fraud caused him
to buy or prevented him from doing so. In either case the fraud would frustrate
Congress' purpose, as we have said; and, in either case, allowing the private remedy
would serve to vindicate that purpose.
The standing requirement rests in part upon other considerations, however.
Cases allowing private suits for injunctive relief make it clear that the "purchaser-
seller" prerequisite to standing to sue for damages rests largely on the assumption
that if plaintiff does not allege that he purchased or sold the stock involved in the
fraud it is evident at the outset that his claim must fail "both on proof of loss and
the causal connection with the alleged violation of the Rule."
This assumption is usually justified. Ordinarily there will be little proof (other
than the non-purchaser's own opinion, after the loss) that the non-purchaser would
in fact have purchased but for the fraud, and, if so, how much, when or at what
price; also, generally, the potential number of non-purchasers will be without defin-
able limit.
Id. at 141, quoting, Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d Cir.
1967) (citations and footnotes omitted). In Manor Drug these requirements were met
because there existed (1) objective evidence of a plaintiff's intention to purchase or
sell but for the fraud, which establishes causation, and (2) objective evidence of "price,
quantity, and time of sale, thus making it possible to calculate damages." Id. at 142.
80. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 95
S. Ct. 302 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Petitioner's Brief].
81. See, e.g., Haberman v. Murchison, 468 F.2d 1305, 1311 (2d Cir. 1972); Green-
stein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968).
82. See, e.g., Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 156-57 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
83. See, e.g., Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 763 (5th Cir. 1974); Rekant v.
Dresser, 425 F.2d 872, 879 (5th Cir. 1970).
84. See, e.g., Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455, 456 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 999 (1971).
85. See, e.g., City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 227-28 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1243 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970); Erling v. Powell, 429 F.2d 795, 799-800 (8th Cir.
1970).
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a 10b-5 cause of action to be a purchaser-seller of the securities in
questionA86 The petitioners, although noting that the Seventh Circuit
has expressly abrogated the purchaser-seller limitation, insist that the
doctrine is still vital and fulfills a necessary function in the regulation
of securities.827 Any "exceptions" to the Birnbaum doctrine have been
carefully distinguished and explained; further, the petition states that
the facts of this case do not present a situation where there should be
a promulgation of a further exception to the doctrine. 8
The respondent in the Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari9 stresses the "anomalous circumstance[s]" of the case, noting the
exceptions to the Birnbaum doctrine that other courts have been willing
to fashion when the facts justify such a treatment. 0 In addition, the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission filed an amicus curiae brief in sup-
port of the Writ of Certiorari which tendered yet another position,
namely that the Birnbaum doctrine itself is "unsound and should be re-
jected."9 1
If the Court should decide the case on this issue, it can make that
decision on one of three potential alternatives: first, affirming the
Birnbaum doctrine and denying that the facts here are deserving of a
specific exception; second, affirming the Birnbaum doctrine but with a
86. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 80, at 14-15.
87. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 80, at 15.
88. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 80, at 17.
89. Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Certiorari, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 95 S. Ct. 302 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Respondent's Brief].
90. Respondents Brief, supra note 89, at 20-23. The respondent argues:
It cannot be over-stressed that the facts in the present case present a situation unlike
any other with which a court in determining standing under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 has had to wrestle. Succinctly stated, we have here the anomalous circum-
stance wherein a defendant under the mandate of a court decree must offer, to a
specified class, securities at a bargain price, yet which offering, for reasons of its
own monetary gain the defendant hopes and attempts to insure through its fraud
will be unsuccessful.
Id. at 23.
91. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 5, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
95 S. Ct. 302 (1974). The SEC argues:
The Birnbaum rule is yet another such restrictive construction unjustified by the
words or the purposes of the Act. Although there is a private right of action for
damages caused by a violation of Rule 10b-5, the Birnbaum rule operates to
deny this remedy to an entire class of fraud victims, depriving them of the
protection the securities laws were intended to afford. There are often mis-
representations the purpose or effect of which-as in the instant case-is to pre-
vent the purchase or sale of securities. There is no reason why victims of a
fraud who suffer a loss should be treated less favorably when the loss results from
their failure to make a "bargain" purchase than when it results from making a
purchase that turns out to be no bargain.
Id. at 6 (citations omitted).
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broad and liberal interpretation of the doctrine, allowing for an excep-
tion for this and other anomalous fact situations; or third, abolishing
the Birnbaum doctrine.
The petitioner's second allegation is that the Court of Appeals deci-
sion allows a non-party to a consent decree to assert the rights of that
decree in a separate proceeding,92 contrary to the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court9 3 and the Eighth Circuit.94  This argu-
ment notes that the majority in the lower court opinion used the consent
decree to give rights to the respondents and that, since a consent decree
has a very limited purpose, it should be delimited to the decree itself,
and not incorporate by reference any other avowed purposes. 95
Therefore, the petitioners assert that the respondents should not be
given the privilege of relying on rights which were not really theirs.
The respondents counter that the decision does not depend or rely on
the enforcement of the consent decree by non-parties; instead, the
Court of Appeals merely used the decree to show the right to receive
certain securities at a certain price which evolved from the consent de-
cree in favor of the respondents.9" It is further noted that the cause
of action asserted was a federal regulating statute, not a breach of a
consent decree.97 If the Court should decide the case on this issue,
it would implicitly, if not explicitly, accept the basic contention of the
Birnbaum doctrine. If the Court should accept the SEC's position to
abolish the entire doctrine, 98 the question of rights under the consent
decree would be moot.
The third and final contention made in the petition for certiorari is
that the lower court opinion is in conflict with the 1933 Act's policy
of discouraging unduly optimistic prospectuses.99 Petitioners reason
that, under the 1933 Act, any adverse potentialities must be disclosed
with a statement as to their importance. Further, if under 10b-5 one
would be required to conservatively assess negative factors, the pro-
spectus draftsman would be in a very difficult (impossible?) position:
92. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 80, at 18-22.
93. United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673 (1971).
94. Data Proc. Fin. & Gen. Corp. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 430 F.2d 1277
(8th Cir. 1970), affg Control Data Corp. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 306 F.
Supp. 839 (D. Minn. 1969).
95. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 80, at 19.
96. Respondent's Brief, supra note 89, at 40-44.
97. Respondent's Brief, supra note 89, at 44.
98. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
99. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 80, at 22-25.
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on the one hand, the draftsman would be required to disclose and ade-
quately discuss adverse factors and on the other hand, not unjustly high-
light these factors. 100 Because of this precarious position, petitioners
urge that the Court of Appeals decision be reversed so that the 1933
and 1934 Acts are read in harmony.10 Respondents answer that there
is nothing in the 1933 Act which sanctions an over-emphasis of adverse
factors to fraudulently dissuade sales to prospective purchasers. More-
over, all the 1933 Act requires is "an honest and fair disclosure and
presentation."' 0 2  This, it is argued, is not in disagreement with the
purposes of the 1934 Act.'
By granting certiorari, the Court has presumably decided to clarify
the existing nebula surrounding the Birnbaum doctrine. Although the
petitioners raise three arguments,104 it is clear that the gravaman of the
case is the right of a non-purchaser-seller to use the lOb-5 cause of
action. It would do a disservice to litigators of future securities cases
not to elucidate the standing requirement for one of the most widely
relied-upon sections of the federal securities law. The Supreme Court
has, in the past, intentionally avoided discussing the validity or invalid-
ity of the Birnbaum doctrine, leaving this question to the discretion of
the nation's district and circuit courts.10 5 As a result, there is not only
conflicting case law between the circuits, 00. but also confusion within
the individual circuits. Whatever position the Supreme Court adopts
with respect to the Birnbaum doctrine, it should be definitively es-
poused to terminate the speculation encompassing this enigmatic con-
cept. Such goals as uniform national regulation, one of the main pur-
poses of most national legislation, will continue to be sacrificed until
this issue is unequivocally resolved. For these reasons, it is imperative
that the Court decide the main issue of this case, that of the Birnbaum
doctrine, and not decide the case on the basis of one of the two periph-
eral arguments propounded by the petitioners.1
07
In the past, the Birnbaum doctrine has served the purpose of limiting
100. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 80, at 25.
101. Respondent's Brief, supra note 89, at 44-47.
102. 15 U.S.C. 77j (1970).
103. Id.
104. See text accompanying notes 80-103 supra.
105. There have been a plethora of cases on this issue in which certiorari has
been denied. E.g., Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
106. See notes 80-85 supra and accompanying text.
107. See text accompanying notes 92-103 supra.
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the plaintiffs who can use the 1Ob-5 vehicle to redress securities-related
fraud. By so doing, the doctrine has been a manifestation of the policy
courts adopted in determining who 10b-5 was promulgated to protect:
if affirmed, the Birnbaum doctrine will continue to serve this func-
tion. The question which must be faced is whether, since the estab-
lishment of the purchaser-seller limitation in 1952, attitudes toward the
purpose of 10b-5 have changed sufficiently to justify the change of
what has heretofore been one of the main prerequisites of the 1Ob-
5 cause of action, thereby allowing greater accessibility to the courts
of those injured by fraud or negligence in the securities market.
In casting the mold for future lOb-5 litigation, the Court must take
a number of factors into account, and the policy and purpose of the
cause of action must necessarily be carefully scrutinized. In addition,
there are a number of practical ramifications which must not be for-
gotten, as expounded by Judge Hufstedler in her Manor Drug dis-
sent.'0 8  Probably the most troubling of these considerations is the po-
tential influx of federal litigation which might flow should the limitation
be abrogated. This type of concern is often stressed in judicial opin-
ions by such phrases as "opening the floodgates to litigation"; however,
it is impossible to ascertain to what extent the federal judiciary will ac-
tually be burdened. Another related problem with eradicating the
Birnbaum doctrine is proving the elements of causation and proof of
loss. Although critics of the purchaser-seller doctrine, including the
SEC, argue that this is not a primary function, or at least it is not the
sole function, of the doctrine, they seldom express any opinion as to
how causation and proof of loss will be determined without this type
of limitation. 109
These and other practical considerations should not be the sole guid-
ing light for the Supreme Court's opinion; they should be but one set of
factors that is balanced with the policy of the provisions of lOb-5. And,
after weighing all the considerations, it is somewhat unlikely that the
Court will be willing to scrap completely the Birnbaum doctrine, at
108. See text accompanying note 75 supra; but see A.T. Brod v. Perlow, 375 F.2d
393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967).
109. See, e.g., Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 95 S. Ct. 302 (1974), wherein the SEC fails to discuss any of the potential adverse
ramifications which, could arise if the doctrine is repudiated. Whatever the SEC's rea-
son for this omission may be, it seems that their position as to the abolition of the Birn-
baum doctrine would be enhanced with a careful evaluation and analysis of the issues
and why they believed that the doctrine should not be controlling.
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least without providing some other viable alternative to take its place.
On the other hand, the limitation should not be so formalistic as to
vitiate a seemingly proper plaintiffs cause of action when he is not
within the strict confines of the doctrine but nonetheless can show
special facts which are equivalent to fulfilling the limitation. Such a
strict reading of Birnbaum, although providing for national uniformity,
would be harsh in its application to "novel or atypical" transactions.
From this vantage point, the most suitable alternative is that of affirm-
ing the Ninth Circuit's holding that the Birnbaum doctrine, although
still viable, should be construed liberally to allow plaintiffs with all the
protections of the purchase or sale to be on the same footing as those
parties with an actual purchase or sale.
Alexander H. Good
